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Abstract
When China signed a Protocol of  Accession to the World Trade Organization in De-
cember 2001, other country members were allowed to consider China as a Non-Market 
Economy until the end of  2016. Taking into account this restraint, the aim of  this paper 
is to answer the following question: can the Market Economy Status Recognition (MES) 
be measured by a de-facto compliance? The variable used to measure the compliance is 
the number of  antidumping investigations initiated by each country. Hence, the countries 
which recognize China as a market economy would have a fewer antidumping investiga-
tions than the countries that are still treating Beijing as a Non Market Economy, which is 
the key reason of  why the Chinese Government has been campaigning vigorously since 
2001 to gain a MES status by a larger number of  its economic partners.
Key words: Non-Market Economy Status, Antidumping, WTO, Brazil, Argentina
Resumen
El Protocolo de adhesión de China a la Organización Mundial del Comercio, firmado en 
Diciembre de 2001, permitió a otros países miembros considerar a China como un país 
sin economía de mercado (NME, por sus siglas en inglés) hasta finales del 2016. Este 
trabajo pretende responder a la pregunta: ¿Se puede medir el estatuto de economía del 
mercado (MES, por sus siglas en inglés) según su cumplimiento? La variable utilizada 
para medir el cumplimiento fue el número de investigaciones de antidumping iniciadas 
por país. Se espera que los países que reconocen a China el estatuto de economía del mer-
cado, MES, realicen menos investigaciones antidumping que los que todavía consideran 
que ésta no tiene economía de mercado (NME). Esto explicaría por qué desde el 2001 
el gobierno chino ha estado haciendo una enérgica campaña para ganar la condición de 
MES entre sus socios económicos.
Palabras clave: Estatuto de no economía de mercado, Antidumping, OMC, Brasil, 
Argentina.
Resumo
O protocolo de adesão à Organização Mundial do Comércio da China, assinado em De-
zembro de 2001, permitiu a outros países membros apreciarem a China como nação sem 
economia de mercado (NME, pela sua rubrica no inglês) até o final de 2016. O presente 
artigo visa responder a pergunta: É possível medir o status de economia de mercado 
(MES, pela sua rubrica no inglês) conforme a sua efetivação? A variável aplicada para 
estimar a execução foi à checagem de investigações anti-dumping iniciadas pelos países. 
Espera-se que os países que reconhecem à China a classificação de MES, reduzam o 
número das investigações anti-dumping em comparação com os países que ainda tratam 
esse país como uma economia sem mercado. Isso esclareceria o fato das agressivas cam-
panhas lideradas pelo governo chinês desde 2001 para ganhar o status de MES entre os 
seus parceiros econômicos.
Palavras-chave: Sem economia de mercado, anti-dumping, OMC, Brasil, Argentina.
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Introduction
On September 17th 2001, during the eighteenth session of  the Working Party 
on China –and a few weeks before China´s accession to the World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO) became official–, Long Yongtu the Head of  the Chinese 
Delegation said that “Just as President Jiang Zemin pointed out recently WTO 
accession is a strategic decision made by the Chinese Government under eco-
nomic globalization and is in line with China’s reform and opening-up policy 
and the goal of  establishing a socialist market economic system” (WTO 2013). 
The concept of  “socialist market economy system” remains a complex one 
as it is conceptually inherently contradictory. Within WTO, “transition econo-
mies” are given Non-Market Economy (NME) status. Prior to China´s acces-
sion, ten such transition economies joined the WTO (Qin 2003). In the case 
of  China, its Protocol of  Accession signed on December 2001 allowed other 
country members to consider China as a NME until the end of  2016. 
Even though WTO members can still treat China as a NME, some coun-
tries have already recognized China´s Market Economy Status (MES). With 
this in mind, it is possible to compare those that have already recognized with 
those that have not, in order to study the effects such decisions have on trade 
relations. What are the political-economic implications of  this recognition? and 
what would change after 2016 in relation to China? are two questions that this 
paper addresses. The objective of  the paper is to test the compliance of  the 
recognition of  China as a market economy on the number of  antidumping 
investigations against Chinese products. 
Do antidumping investigations increase, decrease, or fluctuate between both 
extremes? If  there is an effect, then the policy implication will be that after 
2016 this effect is projected to extend to all WTO members. The expectation 
is that, due to a more transparent method for calculating normal values, coun-
tries would initiate fewer investigations than countries that still treat China as a 
NME. That is, countries are expected to comply with the recognition.
The structure of  the paper is as follows: it starts with a concise justifica-
tion of  the study is laid out before moving into the literature discussion and 
substantiation of  the study’s contribution to the discipline. The review of  the 
literature is divided into two sub-areas: (a) studies on China-WTO negotiations 
before 2001; and (b) studies on the content of  China´s Accession Protocol and 
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the MES within WTO. Following this review are discussions on what a NME 
is and the implications of  a NME within WTO. From this analysis the main 
hypotheses of  the paper is presented. Subsequently, the model´s definition and 
the methodology employed to measure the recognition of  China as a market 
economy on the antidumping investigations is outlined. Accordingly, the results 
are presented and the cases of  Argentina and Brazil are highlighted for being 
outliers in the findings. Finally, some concluding remarks are provided. 
Justification of  this study
Brown (2010) demonstrates that there is no prima facie evidence that WTO 
membership since 2001 has limited the incidence of  China exporter´s facing 
new investigations of  dumping behavior. However, there is no work up to 
date on the effect of  the MES recognition on the investigations for dumping. 
The entry into the WTO might have had no effect, but the MES yes. This is 
the main contribution of  this paper. 
The concept of  NME is disconnected from the economic system adopted 
by a country and this is reflected by the fact that some NMEs are members of  
WTO (Cuba, for example); some Market Economies are still non-members 
of  WTO (Monaco, for example), and some members have not been qualified 
as either Market Economies or NME, and therefore have an unclear legal 
status (Cattaneo & Braga 2009). The decision remains mostly political. The 
best example is China since it has NME status with some WTO members 
and, simultaneously, a MES with others.
By 2013 more than 30 countries have recognized China’s Market Econ-
omy Status (MES), including New Zealand, Nigeria, Russia, Pakistan, Ven-
ezuela, Chile, Brazil, Argentina, Australia, Peru, Antigua and Barbuda, Be-
nin, Costa Rica, Djibouti, South Africa, Togo , Ukraine, Guyana, Armenia, 
Kyrgyzstan and the 10 member countries of  the Association of  Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN). However, neither the European Union nor the 
United States have granted MES to China yet. The Memorandums of  rec-
ognition of  Chinese MES are non-regulated agreements, which lack con-
trolling institutions and depend on the “good will” of  the parties. The risk 
of  cheating is high, due to an inexistence of  punishment. Theoretically, the 
deeper an agreement is, the greater the punishments required to maintain 
53
The Political Economy of  the Chinese Market Economy Status given 
by Argentina and Brazil
ISSN 2011– 0324
compliance is in mixed motive games (Downs et al 1996). However, as 
Keohane mentions, “among international organizations, the WTO stands 
out as having quite authoritative and precise rules and a relatively good 
record of  eventual compliance with those rules by governments. So far, 
through diplomatic finesse and compromise the WTO has avoided out-
right refusals” (Keohane 2004:227). 
Furthermore, China pertaining to the WTO since 2001 bolsters legitimacy 
to the memorandums, due to the fact that they are based on China´s Protocol 
of  Accession to the organization. Recognizing China as a market economy 
within WTO would act as a “Seal of  Approval”. Institutions can create reg-
ularized expectations of  members´ future behavior and therefore promote 
more stable patterns of  behavior among members (Gray 2009). Then, it is 
possible to expect a measurable effect in the compliance of  the MES recogni-
tion, through the antidumping investigations. 
Bibliographic Review on Chinese access to WTO
The literature on China’s entry to the WTO is extensive and has generated 
more than 20,000 scholarly contributions (Cattaneo & Braga 2009). It can 
be divided into two sub-areas which analyze: (a) the historical evolution of  
the relationship between  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
and WTO with China; (b) the content of  China’s Accession Protocol and 
the MES within WTO. This latter sub-area is the most relevant for this ar-
ticle and its contribution. This section will briefly review both subsections 
before deepening into the MES implications for the Chinese economy.
Historical evolution of  the relationship between GATT and WTO with China
The 15 years of  negotiations between China and the WTO have been 
studied in depth and there is a rich literature about it. It is also necessary 
to mention that the history of  China’s WTO has its background in the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), in which it was a found-
ing member (Halveson 2004). Bhala (1999) and Halverson (2004) point 
out that it is necessary to go back to 1948 to truly understand this com-
plex history during which profound changes happened in the bosom of  
China. There are three main historical reasons for this long term complex 
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process and Table 1 summarizes the main historical facts discussed by the 
authors. First of  all, and most importantly, the communist revolution and 
the Taiwan’s split. Second, the different positions existing within domestic 
politics in China. As Douglas Newkirk –a former Assistant United States 
Trade Representative– commented, “[t]he GATT wasn´t written with a so-
cialist market economy in mind. The China´s transition from a communist 
to a market economy, and the often-repeated, oxymoronic declaration by 
its elder leaders that it has a `socialist market economy´ complicated the 
entry process” (Bhala 1999, p.1480). The third reason that complicated 
the negotiations was whether China would gain admission as a developing 
or developed country. United States insisted that China join the WTO as 
a developed country which implicated heavier concessions from China. 
After fifteen years of  negotiations, by the end of  the millennium the pro-
accession forces in the Chinese government gained the domestic battle 
arguing that the advantages of  membership would outweigh the disadvan-
tages. The bilateral agreement with the US and the EU in 1999 and 2000, 
respectively, routed the long awaited entry of  China into the WTO which 
was finalized in December 2001.
The literature emphasizes that the history of  China’s accession to the 
WTO is signed by comings and goings (Bhala 1999; Brown 2010; Cattaneo 
& Braga 2009; Halverson 2004). As Bhala (1999) puts it, the story itself  is 
an epic saga, and no country seeking WTO membership –not even Saudi 
Arabia (which acceded in December 2005 after ten years of  negotiations), 
Iran (which has not acceded yet and submitted its application in July 1996), 
and Russia (which acceded in August 2012 after 19 years of  negotiations)– 
could possibly raise a more complex array of  issues than China.
In the same direction, Cattaneo & Braga (2009) point out that it took 
China more than fifteen years to complete the process, compared to less 
than three years for the Kyrgyz Republic which is also a NME. The China 
accession protocol consisted of  a main text of  11 pages and 143 para-
graphs incorporated by reference from the 77 pages Working Party Report, 
compared to a main text of  no more than two pages of  standardized pro-
visions for some other countries´ accession protocols.
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Table 1. Historical evolution of  the relationship between GATT and WTO 
with China
Source: Bhala (1999) and Halverson (2004).
Year Event
1948 GATT goes into effect (China is a contracting Party)
1950 China withdraws from GATT 
1965 Taiwan joins GATT as a non-voting observer
1971
China became a full member of  the General Assembly and permanent 
member of  the Security Council
GATT revoked Taiwan's observer status
1982 China granted observer status in GATT
1986
China notifies GATT of  intent to renegotiate terms of  membership
Hong Kong becomes a GATT Contracting Party
1987 Working party on China´s membership to GATT established
1989 Discussions of  China´s membership suspended until 1992 due to Tiananmen crisis
1992 Working party on Taiwan´s Accession established
1994 Uruguay round of  trade negotiations completed (China is signatory)
1995 WTO enters into force; China applies for accession to WTO
1999 United States and China sign bilateral agreement on China´s accession
2000
U.S. Congress passes Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) legislation
EU and China sign a bilateral agreement on China´s accession
2001 China´s accession to WTO becomes effective (Taiwan joins shortly thereafter)
Content of  China’s Accession Protocol and the Market Economy Status within WTO
As mentioned before, this second literature group is the most relevant to 
this work. The reason is that papers that deal with the Accession Proto-
col study in detail the treatment of  China as a NME, and the provisions 
regarding the use of  anti-dumping measures against Chinese products. 
Among the literature in this area Qin (2003), Cattaneo & Braga (2009), 
Zang (2011), and Tietje & Nowrot (2011) stand out. 
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China’s Protocol of  Accession to the WTO, signed on December 2001, 
permitted other country members to consider China as a NME until the end 
of  2016. By the beginning of  2013 more than 30 countries recognized China’s 
MES but neither the European Union nor the United States granted MES to 
China, and both apply the so-called surrogate or analogue country method to 
establish dumping, relying on price or production data from third countries 
(Zang 2011). Unlike any other WTO protocol of  accession, “the China Pro-
tocol is not a standardized document. Instead, it contains a large number of  
special provisions that elaborate, expand, modify or derivate from the existing 
WTO agreements” (Qin 2003:489).
Qin (2003) focuses on a set of  special provisions of  the China Proto-
col: those that prescribe obligations exceeding the existing requirements 
of  the WTO agreements, which she calls “WTO-plus” obligations. The 
major WTO-plus obligations undertaken by the Chinese government con-
cern the following areas: (1) transparency, (2) judicial review, (3) uniform 
administration, (4) national treatment, (5) foreign investment, (6) market 
economy, and (7) transitional review. The most significant of  such obliga-
tions include the obligation to let market forces determine prices in China, 
obligations not to influence state-owned and state-invested enterprises, 
and obligation to liberalize foreign trade regime.
Section 9 of  the Protocol prescribes an overall market economy obligation 
for China: the obligation to “allow prices for traded goods and services in every 
sector to be determined by market forces except for those specified in Annex 
4 of  the Protocol (emphasis added)” (Qin, 2003:505). Historically, it has been a 
major challenge for the system to integrate centrally planned economies as the 
multilateral trading system is constructed with market economy assumptions. 
“The problem of  integrating NMEs into the system has been largely abated in 
the post-cold war era when most of  the former centrally planned economies 
began transforming into market economies” (Qin, 2003:504). 
The problem, as argued in the literature, lies in how to incorporate NMEs in 
respect to market principles of  WTO treaties. Cattaneo & Braga (2009) argue 
that the accession process has created a “two-tier” membership or a “second 
class” of  WTO citizens, and the interpretation of  accession protocols created 
a whole new branch of  WTO law and jurisprudence. As Zang (2011) explains, 
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China argued that section 15 of  the Accession Protocol does not contain ‘an 
official recognition by China’ that it is an NME, but only a temporary and lim-
ited derogation from the rules in the Anti-Dumping Agreement on the deter-
mination of  normal value in anti-dumping investigations initiated with respect 
to imports from China. However, it is clear that section 15 of  the Accession 
Protocol in the major WTO authority for the special treatment towards China 
in Anti-dumping proceedings (Zang, 2011:876). 
Paragraphs 15(a) and (d) concern exclusively the determination of  normal 
value. While paragraph (a) contains special rules of  determination of  normal 
value in Anti-dumping investigation involving China, paragraph 15(d) in turn 
establishes that these special rules will expire in 2016 and set out certain condi-
tions that may lead to early termination of  these rules before 2016. For lawyers 
and governmental officials dealing with anti-dumping law and practice, the 11 
December 2016 is certainly not a myth –it is reality–. From that date onwards, 
it becomes almost impossible –at least from the perspective of  WTO law– to 
make a determination of  the normal value of  products targeted by an anti-
dumping proceeding on the bases of  analogous third country methodology 
(Tietje & Nowrot 2011). This method is “extremely unfavorable for Chinese 
exports because the choice of  a surrogate country is often perceived as arbi-
trary or inappropriate, and the resulting antidumping duties tend to be exceed-
ingly high” (IBA 2010:5). As a consequence, the Chinese Government has been 
campaigning vigorously among its trading partners to gain MES before 2016.
Defining a Hypothesis: what are the consequences of  being granted 
Non-Market Status?
The general issue of  the NME Status has been addressed substantially by 
Polouektov (2002); Qin (2003) and Shao (2008). Furthermore, Alford (1987), 
Shao (2008), Cattaneo & Braga (2009), Brown (2010), and Tietje & Nowrot 
(2011) have also addressed the particular case of  Chinese NME Status.
Polouektov addresses the case of  Poland for being the first “orthodox” 
centrally planned economy to become a GATT contracting party in 1967, 
followed by Romania in 1971 and Hungary in 1973. After the collapse of  the 
Soviet Union in 1991, former satellites moved from centrally-planned to mar-
ket economies, formally becoming “transition economies”. In the immediate 
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years after the WTO came into being, 10 more transition economies became 
members recognizing special treatment in their Protocols of  Accession1 (Cat-
taneo & Braga 2009; Polouektov 2002). 
The NME issue has its roots in paragraph 1 of  the antidumping Article VI 
of  GATT 1994. “It is recognized that, in the case of  imports from a country 
which has a complete or substantially complete monopoly of  its trade and 
where all domestic prices are fixed by the State, special difficulties may exist in 
determining price comparability for the purposes of  paragraph 1, and in such 
cases importing contracting parties may find it necessary to take into account 
the possibility that a strict comparison with domestic prices in such a coun-
try may not always be appropriate” (Shao 2008:13). Through this provision, 
WTO Members explicitly recognize NME countries may need to be treated 
differently than market economies in antidumping cases.
This paper asks whether the recognition of  Chinese MES by some 
countries has had any effect in new investigations of  dumping behavior. 
To date, there is no work that has answered this question. The main hy-
pothesis of  this work (H1) is that, even though the WTO accession by 
China has not led to a reduction in the use of  Anti-Dumping measures 
(Brown, 2010), recognition of  market economy itself  has had a positive 
effect in reducing measures against China.
Masserlin (2004) and Brown (2010) highlight that most of  anti-dumping 
investigations and measures imposed are initiated by the so called four major 
traditional users (Australia, Canada, EU, and USA) and from six new inten-
sive antidumping users which are developing economies (Argentina, Brazil, 
India, Mexico, South Africa, and Turkey). Both authors assert that China is 
targeted much more by developing economies than by industrial countries. 
The ten most intensive Anti-Dumping user contributed 83 percent of  the 
new investigations and 68 percent of  the new measures imposed even as 
the total antidumping use by WTO members continues to grow, especially 
with the emergence of  China itself  as a major new user (Brown 2010:8). 
Comparing the aggregated data of  antidumping use against China during 
its pre- accession (1995-2001) versus post- accession (2002-2006) period, 
1 Mongolia, Bulgaria, the Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Estonia, Albania, Croatia, Georgia, Lithuania and Moldova.
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Brown (2010) concludes that there is no prima facie evidence that WTO 
membership has thus far limited the incidence of  China exporter’s facing 
new investigations of  dumping behavior.
According to Polouektov, differential treatment generates contradictions 
with the principle of  non-discrimination in the WTO. The preservation in 
the present circumstances of  the long outdated NME concept constitutes an 
intentional disregard for world realities, which risks bringing back a “second 
class” membership and further erosion of  the fundamentals of  the multilat-
eral trade framework. In contravention of  the obligations under the WTO, a 
number of  members retained (“grandfathered”) or adopted a new the NME 
concept, thus deviating from the language of  the Uruguay Round Anti-
Dumping Agreement (Polouektov 2002:3).
The Anti-Dumping Agreement narrows down the range of  possible op-
tions for calculating whether a particular product is being dumped (WTO, 
2012). It provides three methods to calculate a product’s “normal value” 
(GATT, 1994): (a) The main one is based on the price in the exporter’s do-
mestic market. When it cannot be used (this is the case for NMEs), two alter-
natives are available, (b) the price charged by the exporter in another country, 
or (c) a calculation based on the combination of  the exporter’s production 
costs, other expenses and normal profit margins. 
Then, the consequences of  not being granted MES would have a big 
impact on the investigation for dumping. For example, if  China is accused 
of  dumping car tires, the basic approach is to consider the price of  car tires 
in China against the price of  Chinese car tires in Europe. Because China 
does not have MES, Chinese domestic prices cannot be used as a refer-
ence. Instead, the initiator would use an analogue market: one which does 
have market economy status, and which is similar enough to China. United 
States is a popular analogue market, and for China sometimes Brazil and 
Mexico are also used. In this case, the price of  car tires in the United States 
is regarded as the substitute for the price of  car tires in China, which of  
course is detrimental to China as the cost of  labor is much lower. China 
has allowed, through its protocol of  accession, that WTO members may 
pursue a NME approach to the calculation of  normal value and dumping 
margins, and of  course, this method would not be used anymore if  China 
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was considered a market economy. It can be imagined, thus, that recog-
nizing Chinese MES would reduce the amount of  antidumping measures 
initiated against this country.
Method and Data
The paper tests the hypothesis that the recognition of  China as a Market 
Economy had a negative impact on the number of  antidumping investiga-
tions initiated against Chinese products by countries that had recognized 
China before. To control the effect of  the MES recognition on the use of  
antidumping investigations in the statistical model it tests two additional 
hypotheses. (H2) The higher the share of  Chinese imports in local market, 
the better the chances of  initiating an antidumping investigation against a 
Chinese product; and (H3) the more open to trade a country is, the worse 
the chances of  using antidumping measures. Table 2 presents the three 
hypotheses tested, and the expected effect of  the variable chosen to opera-
tionalize each hypotheses. The three independent variables to test the three 
hypotheses are: (a) Recognition of  Chinese MES, (b) Share of  Chinese im-
ports to total imports, (c) Trade Openness.
Table 2. Hypotheses and independent variables in the model
Source: Elaborated by the author.
Independent 
Variables Type
Expected 
effect on the 
Dependent 
Variable
Hypotheses
Recognition of  
Chinese Market 
Economy 
Status
Dummy 
(0, 1) Negative (-)
H1: Recognizing China as a Market 
Economy has a negative impact on 
the number of  AD investigations 
initiated against Chinese products
Share of  
Chinese 
imports to total 
imports (t-1)
Continuous 
[0 - 1] Positive (+)
H2: The higher the share of  Chinese 
imports in local market, the better 
the chances of  initiating an AD 
measure against a Chinese product
Openness 
Index
Continuous 
[0 - ∞)
Negative (-)
H3: The more open a country is, 
the worse the chances of  using 
antidumping measures
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Data sources 
The statistic data used to build the three independent variables were taken 
from four databases: (a) Global Antidumping Database (GAD) which is 
part of  the Temporary Trade Barriers Database (TTBD) World Bank and 
lead by Chad :Brown (2007), (b) UNCTAD Trade Map - International Trade 
Centre UNCTAD/WTO (ITC), (c) UN Comtrade, (d) World Bank World 
Development Indicators.
GAD has been freely and publicly available since 2005, hosts detailed 
data on more than thirty different national governments’ use of  policies 
such as antidumping, global safeguards, China-specific transitional safe-
guard measures, and countervailing duties. The authors considered the 31 
countries available in the GAD Database, using all the antidumping mea-
sures initiated by China per year. As can be seen in Table 3, not every coun-
try in the database recognizes Chinese MES. 
Table 3. Countries considered in this paper
Country Available data
# of  AD investigations 
against China
Recognized Chinese 
MES (Year)
Argentina 1993 -2011 79 2004
Australia 1989-2011 29 2005
Brazil 1988-2011 59 2004
Canada 1985-2011 35 -
Chile 1995-2011 1 2002
Colombia 1991-2011 27 -
Costa Rica 1996-2011 - 2008
European Union 1978-2011 143 -
India 1992-2011 147 -
Indonesia 1996-2011 12 2004
Israel 1991-2011 7 -
Jamaica 2000-2011 1 2005
Japan 1991-2011 2 -
Malaysia 1995-2011 1 2004
Mexico 1987-2011 52 -
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Source: Elaborated by the author. (*) Poland is also included in European 
Union after 2004
Country Available data
# of  AD investigations 
against China
Recognized Chinese 
MES (Year)
New Zealand 1995-2011 8 2004
Pakistan 2002-2011 10 2004
Paraguay 1999-2011 - -
Peru 1992-2011 56 2004
Philippines 1994-2011 3 2004
Poland* 1995-2011 2 -
South Africa 1992-2011 46 2004
South Korea 1986-2011 27 2005
Taiwan 1984-2011 6 -
Thailand 1996-2011 14 2004
Trinidad and 
Tobago 1997- 2011 2
-
Turkey 1989-2011 28 -
Ukraine 1995-2011 6 -
United States 1980-2011 165 -
Uruguay 1997- 2011 - -
Venezuela 1992-2011 3 2004
The UN Comtrade database was used to build the share of  Chinese im-
ports on total imports. The index was calculated with a lag of  one year to take 
into account the assumption that there is a greater propensity to protect using 
an Anti-Dumping when the previous year’s imports increased considerably.
Three units of  analysis deserve a special note. Data for Taiwan is not avail-
able in UN Comtrade, so Trademap was used instead. Data for South Africa 
was not complete, so the index was built using data from its Department of  
Trade and Industry. Finally, data from the European Union was built in accor-
dance to its expansions in 1981, 1986, 1990, 1995, 2004 and 2007 so Poland 
is considered as a unit before 2004. WTO statistics were used to take data on 
EU imports from the World. 
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World Bank Development Indicators provided information on Trade 
Openness, which is calculated as the sum of  exports and imports of  goods 
and services measured as a share of  gross domestic product. Behind this vari-
able is the assumption that more open countries tend to be less protective of  
its domestic industry. 
The baseline model of  this work can be summarized as:
# AD investigations against China = β0 + β1 MES Recognition + 
β2 
Imports from China/Total Imports (t - 1) + β3 Trade (% of  GDP) + εi
Data Analysis and Model Specification 
This section analyzes the data, and afterwards tests which regression mo-
del best fits the research problem. The base model is simple and has only 
three independent variables to avoid overly confusing results, and collinearity 
amongst explanatory factors. As the relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables is nonlinear, an OLS model does not seem to be the 
best alternative. Another problem has to do with the assumption of  homos-
cedasticity within it. The best model would be the one that can count how 
many times something has happened, so a Count Model would work better. 
Gary King (1989) recognized that most empirical analyses in international 
relations are based on event count variables. Unfortunately, with few excep-
tions, scholars in international relations have neither designed nor exploited 
such methods. The most frequently used statistical model in this area, linear 
regression, makes the incorrect assumption that underlying continuous pro-
cesses generate observations that are also continuous (King 1989:124). 
Earlier, King (1988) explains these caveats: 
“[…] there are several serious problems in using event count data with 
the OLS model. First, OLS assumes a linear relationship, E(y I X) = 
XP = Po + P I X , + P,X, + . . . . This is an implausible functional 
form for two reasons: (1) it often results in predicted event counts that 
are less than zero and therefore meaningless. Moreover, a “truncated 
linear” model, where negative fitted values are forced to zero, makes 
unrealistic assumptions at and near the cutoff  point. Furthermore, (2) 
it makes the unrealistic assumption that the difference between zero 
and one event occurring in a particular time interval is the same as the 
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difference between, say, 20 and 21 events. Thus, the true relationship 
is not linear, and a linear approximation would not in most cases even 
be a reasonable working assumption” (King, 1988:845)
Since this work uses a cross sectional method instead of  a times series one, it is 
working under the assumption that each year of  the sample is independent from 
the others. The principle of  independence holds that “the probability of  an event 
occurring at time t + 1, given what has occurred up to time t, is independent of  
all previous history within a single observation period” (King, 1989:127). Under 
the independence principle, antidumping investigations are not contagious, that 
is, the occurrence of  an antidumping measure does not increase the probability 
of  future antidumping investigations. As they are initiated by private actors (com-
panies, or chambers) it is not mistaken to hold onto this assumption.
Most of  the years recorded had one antidumping investigation against a 
Chinese product. The database omits years when there were no measures, 
so the database has no zeros. A useful place to begin is comparing predicted 
and observed values (Long, 1997). The listed values in Table 4 are the ob-
served and predicted probabilities for observing a country with 0 through 9 
antidumping investigations in a given year.
Table 4. Observed and predicted probabilities
Source: Elaborated by the author.
Value 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Observed 0 0.375 0.165 0.121 0.077 0.063 0.059 0.026 0.022 0.018
Predicted 0.531 0.129 0.182 0.189 0.159 0.115 0.074 0.044 0.025 0.013
The probabilities above show that the fitted Poisson distribution over-pre-
dicts 0s and under-predicts count 1. This pattern of  over- and under-prediction 
is characteristic of  fitting a count model that does not take into account het-
erogeneity among sample members in their rate μ (Long and Freese 2006). In 
order to choose the best fit count model two questions need to be answered: (a) 
How is the outcome variable distributed?, or How does the variance compare 
to the mean?, and (b) Does the outcome variable contain zeroes?, If  not, why?
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(a) Count variables indicate how many times something has happened. 
Poisson Regression (PRM), the most common count model works with a 
very strong assumption that is the conditional variance equals the conditional 
mean. If  this is not the case, Negative Binomial Regression (NBRM) can be 
used for over-dispersed count data, that is, when the conditional variance ex-
ceeds the conditional mean; (b) If  the data generating process does not allow 
for any 0s, then a zero-truncated model (ZTPM) may be more appropriate. 
It is necessary to test dispersion in the sample to observe whether Poison 
Regression or NBRM has a better fit. As the database omits all the zeros —
that is, it has no information when there are none antidumping investigations 
against a Chinese product- a truncated model probably is the best model to be 
used. Table 4 summarizes the count models tested in this section. To assess if  
either PRM or NBRM work better, several tests were run. First, the observed 
variable together with PRM and NBRM was plotted. As a second test, the 
model residuals for PRM and NBRM are compared. Third, Pearson Chi-Square 
statistic for both PRM and NBRM are evaluated. The three tests offer strong 
evidence for preferring NBRM over a PRM.
Table 5. Characteristics of  the count models considered in the statistical test 
Source: (UCLA, 2012b).
Poisson 
regression
It has a very strong assumption, that is, the conditional 
variance equals conditional mean. Data appropriate for Poisson 
regression do not happen very often. Nevertheless, Poisson 
regression is often used as a starting point for modeling count 
data and Poisson regression has many extensions.
Negative 
binomial 
regression 
Negative binomial regression can be used for over-dispersed count 
data, that is when the conditional variance exceeds the conditional 
mean. It can be considered as a generalization of  Poisson regression 
since it has the same mean structure as Poisson regression and it has 
an extra parameter to model the over-dispersion.
Zero-Truncated 
Poisson 
Regression
If  the data generating process does not allow for any 0s, then a 
zero-truncated model may be more appropriate.
Zero-truncated 
Negative 
Binomial 
Regression
Zero-truncated negative binomial regression is used to model 
count data for which the value zero cannot occur and for which 
the conditional means are not equal to the conditional variances. 
That is, the data exhibit over dispersion.
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Table 6 is a summary of  the regression results for all the possible models. 
As can be seen, all of  them have similar coefficients (except for OLS which 
was included to show its bias), and high statistical significance. Zero-trun-
cated Negative Binomial Regression (ZTNBM) is the count model which 
shows the higher coefficients, and the lower z values. Among the four count 
models, ZTNBM showed the best fit. 
Table 6. Regression Results    
Source: Elaborated by the author.
Dependent 
Variable: 
Number 
of  AD 
investigations 
per year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
 OLS PRM NBRM ZTPRM ZTNBM   
Independent 
Variable
Coefficient
t-statistic
Coefficient
t-statistic
Coefficient
t-statistic
Coefficient
t-statistic
Coefficient
t-statistic
Recognition of  
Chinese Market 
Economy 
Status -2.12*** -0.59*** -0.58*** -0.68*** -0.86***
 (-3.66) (-6.14) (-4.09) (-6.38) (-3.59)   
Share of  
Chinese 
imports to total 
imports (t-1) 19.92*** 5.02*** 5.33*** 5.59*** 8.30***
 -4.07 -7.35 -4.58 -7.86 -3.95
Openness 
Index -0.03*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.02***
 (-4.13) (-7.36) (-5.18) (-7.90) (-4.95)   
Constant 4.22*** 1.54*** 1.50*** 1.58*** 1.16***
 -8.74 -18.94 -12.61 -17.91 -4.84
Lnalpha                    
Constant -1.03*** 0.43
 (-7.04) -1.33
Number of  
observations 272 272 272 272 272
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The graphical representation of  the Fitted Values against each of  the con-
trol variables show that countries that recognized China as MES reduced the 
number of  antidumping investigations, as can be observed in Figure 7 showing 
the fitted values against each of  the control variables.
Figure 7: Fitted Values (N° of  AD investigations) for countries that recog-
nized China´s MES    
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The observed values for the countries that have recognized China as a Mar-
ket Economy show that they have remained below 5 annual investigations, with 
the exception of  Argentina and Brazil during two years each. Such behavior is 
discussed in the next section.
Figure 8: Observed antidumping investigations for countries that recognize 
China´s MES    
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In order to proceed to interpreting the coefficients of  the independent vari-
ables a percentage change in the expected count is used. The percent change 
coefficients for MES Recognition, the Share of  Chinese imports to total im-
ports, and the Openness Index can be read as:
1. Being a country that recognized China´s MES decreases the expected 
number of  antidumping investigations initiated per year by 57.8 percent, 
holding all other variables constant. Excluding Argentina and Brazil in 
the analysis, the percent is 78.5 percent. 
2. For a standard deviation increase in the relative weight of  Chinese 
imports over world imports, a country´s number of  antidumping ini-
tiated against Chinese products increases by 51 percent, holding all 
other variables constant.
3. For a standard deviation increase in the Openness Index, a country´s 
number of  antidumping investigations initiated against Chinese prod-
ucts decreases by 38.4 percent, holding all other variables constant.
Table 9 summarizes the effect found on the independent variables over 
the dependent variable, contrasted with the expected effect predicted by 
the hypotheses. 
Table 9: Comparison of  the observed effects and the expected effects    
Source: Elaborated by the author.
Variable Observed 
effect
Expected 
effect
Recognition of  Chinese Market Economy Status Negative (-) Negative (-)
Share of  Chinese imports to total imports (t-1) Positive (+) Positive (+)
Openness Index Negative (-) Negative (-)
Analyzing the outliers: Argentina and Brazil
During Hu Hintao´s visit to South America in 2004, Argentina and China 
signed a Memorandum of  Understanding –Memorando de entendimiento entre 
la República Argentina y la República Popular China sobre cooperación en mate-
ria de comercio e inversiones– that recognized China as a Market Economy 
in its first article. Brazil did the same in a very similar memorandum –
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Memorando de entendimento entre a República Federativa do Brasil e a 
República Popular da China sobre cooperação em matéria de comércio e 
investimento– three days after.
Argentina and Brazil, which are among the top ten antidumping users in 
the world, have, together, applied 88 investigations against Chinese products 
between 2001 and 2010. Their antidumping investigations did not decrease af-
ter signing the Memorandums of  Understanding, as can be seen in Figure 10.
Figure 10: Comparison of  the observed effects and the expected effects    
Source: Elaborated by the authors with data from the Global Antidumping 
Database.
Deepening discussions into these two cases exceeds this study’s objective, 
however speculative reasons can be considered. A first possible reason for this 
non-compliance is related to the role played by their National Congresses. Bra-
zil never actually declared China to be a market economy in its domestic law 
(as it did with Ukraine in 2007 and a number of  Central and Eastern European 
and Baltic countries in 2008 (IBA, 2010:26)) and the same situation arises in 
Argentina (where the National Congress never ratified this agreement and in 
antidumping proceedings China is still treated as an NME for domestic law). 
A second possible reason is related to the role played by powerful interest 
groups. Domestic industrial groups, Federation of  Industries of  São Paulo 
(FIESP) in Brazil, and the Argentine Industrial Union (UIA) in Argentina, 
strongly opposed to the recognition of  the Chinese MES because of  the fear 
of  an “invasion” of  Chinese products. Domestic actors can sometimes limit 
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states capacity. Theoretically, the entanglement of  internal factors and inter-
national factors is well established by the theory of  James Rosenau (1997) 
and developed previously by Robert Putnam’s theory (1988). How do inter-
nal factors influence the decision of  foreign policy and vice versa, and how 
is the link between national and international affairs are questions that were 
answered using the concept of  intermestic processes. 
Furthermore, in observing the antidumping measures by industry they 
correspond with some of  the most vulnerable sectors in each of  the coun-
tries, in terms of  their Revealed Comparative Advantages. Between 2000 
and 2011, Brazil initiated 16 out of  35 antidumping investigations on the 
manufacturing sector. Argentina 27 out of  51 antidumping investigations on 
the IT sector and in the manufacturing sector.2 
It is possible that the key to understanding the non-compliance of  the mem-
orandums is related to the local industry fear of  a perceived “invasion” of  Chi-
nese products. Numerous papers consider China either a huge opportunity or a 
scary threat for Latin American countries, but most of  them assume that China 
is both a huge opportunity and a big threat (Blázquez-Lidoy et al. 2006; Freitas 
Barbosa 2011; Leon-Manriquez 2006; Mesquita Moreira 2006). This is the case 
for Argentina and Brazil, which benefit from exporting to the huge Chinese 
market, but feel threatened by the imports that come from it. 
Future research, in the form of  a deep comparative analysis needs to 
be done on these two particular cases. Focusing on empirical studies of  
the speculative arguments provided here, a comparison with countries 
that have reduced their antidumping investigations after recognizing the 
MES needs further examination.
 
Conclusion
The issue of  the MES of  China has profound implications on the treatment 
it receives from other WTO members. It is expected that after 2016 all mem-
bers in the organization, including USA and the EU will treat China as a 
Market Economy, and therefore calculate their dumping costs through the 
mechanisms of  normal values. 
2 Based on available data from the Global Antidumping Database.
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As initially stated, the aim of  this paper was to answer the following 
question: Can the Market Economy Status (MES) Recognition be measured 
in its compliance? The proxy used for that compliance was the number of  
antidumping investigations initiated per country. The expectation is that, 
due to a more transparent method for calculating normal values, countries 
recognizing Chinese MES would initiate fewer antidumping investigations 
than countries that still treating China as a NME. This would explain why 
Chinese Government has been campaigning vigorously since 2001 to gain 
MES among its economic partners.
This paper shows that, 14 out of  16 countries in the sample that have rec-
ognized Chinese MES have reduced their antidumping investigations. Being 
a country that recognized China´s MES decreases the expected number of  
antidumping investigations initiated per year by 57.8 percent, holding all other 
variables constant. Excluding Argentina and Brazil in the analysis, the percent 
is 78.5. The model controlled for the relevance that China has in each country´s 
imports and for the economic openness of  each country.
Future works will deepen in the cases of  those countries that have not com-
plied with the Memorandums of  MES recognition that is Argentina and Brazil, 
to explore on the role of  domestic actors, such as industrial lobbies. Further-
more, the econometric model should be improved, including the temporal di-
mension in it, working with panel models. Due to missing data, this paper offers 
a first approach to the matter. 
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